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Dangerous Thoughts? 
Academic Freedom, Free Speech, and Censorship 
Revisited in a Post-September 11th America 
 
Jeffrey S. Strauss* 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 26, 2001, The O’Reilly Factor1 aired an interview 
with Dr. Sami Al-Arian, a Kuwaiti-born Palestinian professor of 
computer science at the University of South Florida (“USF”). During 
the interview, Dr. Al-Arian was repeatedly accused of terrorist 
involvement.2 The interview sparked an alarming chain of events that 
rocked southern Florida’s academic world. In the days immediately 
following Al-Arian’s appearance, USF received an overwhelming 
number of calls and letters, both threatening Al-Arian and attracting 
negative media attention to the University.3 After giving Al-Arian an 
extended paid leave, USF President Judy Genshaft released a 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2004, Washington University School of Law. 
 1. The O’Reilly Factor is a television news program, broadcast on the FOX News cable 
network. 
 2. In the September 26, 2001 interview, host Bill O’Reilly accused Al-Arian of “having 
radical views, of having made radical statements in the past, and of having possible ties to 
terrorist groups.” Thor L. Halvorssen, The University of South Florida Betrays the Rule of Law: 
The “Thug’s Veto” and the Ongoing Case of Sami Al-Arian, FOUNDATION FOR INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS IN EDUCATION (FIRE) (Jan. 29, 2002), at http://www.thefire.org/issues/arian.php3 (on 
file with the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy). O’Reilly persisted in his 
accusations, despite Al-Arian’s repeated denials of having any terrorist involvement. Id. 
 It should be noted that at that time, Al-Arian had not been charged with any crime, even 
after intense investigation by the FBI and other U.S. authorities. University Seeks to Fire 
Scholar for Reputed Link to Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2002, at A18 [hereinafter Fire 
Scholar]. See also infra note 13. 
 3. Lou Marano, University Moves to Fire ‘Disruptive’ Prof, UPI, Jan. 29, 2002, LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, UPI File. At times, the disruption to the school was severe enough to require the 
temporary closing of parts of the USF College of Engineering. Memorandum from Thomas M. 
Gonzalez, Attorney, to R. B. Friedlander, Interim General Counsel, University of South Florida 
(Dec. 17, 2001) at para. 5 [hereinafter Gonzalez], available at http://www.usf.edu/News/2001/ 
arianindex.htm. 
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statement announcing the University’s intention to revoke Al-Arian’s 
tenure and terminate his employment.4 
Sami Al-Arian’s case is just one example of the hateful public 
response that often arises when professors and other public 
individuals act or speak in a controversial manner.5 Though such 
words or actions are rarely intended to harm anyone or to incite 
raucousness, the offended public frequently demands strong 
reprimands or termination.6 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United 
States, now more than ever, must be wary of when and to what extent 
academia gives in to the pressures applied by a newly frightened and 
paranoid public. It is true that academic institutions have some legal 
right to control the conduct of their professors, especially actions 
within the scope of one’s professional employment.7 Yet, it is equally 
true that all citizens’ First Amendment speech and expression rights 
continue to be paramount principles of American constitutional law.8 
 4. Press Release, Judy Genshaft, President, University of South Florida, Statement of 
University of South Florida President Judy Genshaft (Dec. 19, 2001) [hereinafter Genshaft], 
available at http://www.usf.edu/News/2001/arianindex.htm. Prior to the start of the 2002–03 
academic year, USF reiterated its plan not only to dismiss Al-Arian, but also to pursue a judicial 
declaration of the dismissal’s validity, thus enjoining Al-Arian from pursuing his own legal 
claims. Fire Scholar, supra note 2, at A18. However, on December 16, 2002, the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Florida declined to hear USF’s declarative suit, 
allowing Al-Arian to continue his pursuit of First Amendment claims. Judge Declines to Hear 
University Case, UPI, Dec. 16, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File [hereinafter Judge 
Declines]. The District Court, in dismissing USF’s declarative suit, considered only judicial 
intervention, and did not address the merits of USF’s or Al-Arian’s claims. Id. at para. 8. 
 5. Also consider the case of the late Columbia University Professor Edward W. Said, an 
outspoken Palestinian advocate. See Karen W. Arenson, Columbia Debates a Professor’s 
‘Gesture,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2000, at B3. When photographs were released that depicted 
him hurling a rock at an Israeli guardhouse from the Lebanese border, many demanded that 
Columbia denounce the action and reprimand Professor Said. Id. However, Columbia 
University issued a statement defending Said’s right to academic freedom and freedom of 
expression, stating Said’s gestures were protected because “‘the stone was directed at no one; 
no law was broken . . . no criminal or civil action has been taken against Professor Said.’” Id. 
(quoting the Columbia University Provost’s statement in the school newspaper). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (discussing 
the need for universities to retain a right to control academic environment and curriculum). 
 8. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (discussing America’s deep 
commitment to “safeguarding academic freedom” and defending the important First 
Amendment individual liberties). 
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In the specific case between USF and Al-Arian, other significant 
factors and considerations come into play. First, Al-Arian was a 
tenured professor at USF, a public university. His employer was the 
State of Florida, a government, as opposed to a private employer.9 
Second, the statements and actions that led to the “disruption” on 
USF’s campus occurred outside the classroom, the campus, and Al-
Arian’s scope of employment.10 Finally, although it is quite clear that 
a “disruption,” in the form of threatening letters and phone calls, 
occurred following the O’Reilly appearance, it is important to 
consider both the true source of the alleged disruption,11 and what 
actually constitutes an actionable disruption.12 
The primary aim of this Note is to use the case of Sami Al-Arian 
as a framework13 for an examination of the situation in which 
disruption and (perhaps unfounded) public outcry are cited to negate 
 9. USF is one of eleven public universities in Florida. The state government, specifically 
the Division of Colleges & Universities within the Florida Board of Education, Colleges & 
Universities, operates USF and the other universities. See Board of Education, Tour Florida’s 
Universities, at http://www.fldcu.org/univ_info/unitour.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2003). 
 10. The initial spark for the public reaction was Al-Arian’s appearance on The O’Reilly 
Factor. In addition, on October 28, 2001, television news magazine Dateline NBC showed a 
film clip from thirteen years earlier, in which Sami Al-Arian made strong anti-Israel remarks at 
a 1988 conference in Cleveland. Stephen Goode, Free Speech vs. Campus Security, INSIGHT, 
Feb. 13, 2002, at http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm/include/detail/storyid/182119.html. 
 11. For example, in this case, the disruption might be more properly understood as the 
direct result of the regrettable actions of the “angry individuals outside of the University, who 
wished to see Professor Al-Arian sanctioned, fired, or harmed for his protected beliefs and 
affiliations.” Halvorssen, supra note 2, at para. 5 (quoting FIRE president and University of 
Pennsylvania history professor Alan Charles Kors). 
 12. Courts invoke a balancing test between the public employee’s right to free expression 
and the public employer’s right to avoid undue disruption that might impair its ability to 
provide its services. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 
U.S. 378 (1987); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The balancing test, first 
formally delineated by the Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education, is discussed in 
detail infra notes 63–87 and accompanying text. 
 13. On February 20, 2003 (after this Note had been written and submitted for publication), 
Sami Al-Arian was taken into custody by FBI agents. Al-Arian, along with seven others, were 
indicted on numerous charges, including terrorism-related crimes. USF Professors Vow to 
Stand by Colleague, UPI, Feb. 21, 2003, LEXIS, NEXIS Library, UPI File [hereinafter USF 
Professors]. This Note does not aspire to predict or in any way endorse the guilt or innocence of 
Sami Al-Arian. Further, while his story is used as a framework, the eventual fate of Al-Arian is 
not crucial to this Note’s purpose regarding issues of legal and constitutional rights. See 
Addendum to Dangerous Thoughts?: Accounting For the Arrest of Sami Al-Arian, 15 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 269 (2004). 
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so-called “academic freedom” and to censure a professor’s right to 
free expression.14 
Part I of this Note discusses the recent legal history of content-
based regulation of speech, including the criteria for “content-based” 
classification and the resulting strict scrutiny test. Part II gives an 
overview of the “fighting words” doctrine, which provides for the 
unquestioned censorship of certain types of inflammatory speech 
falling entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment. Part 
III focuses on the history of academic freedom as a legal doctrine, 
particularly examining whether the freedom is vested in an individual 
instructor or in the academic institution. In Part IV, this Note 
discusses “disruption” as a means of justifying the restriction of a 
public employee’s statements or expressions. Part V analyzes the law 
with respect to Al-Arian’s case, concluding that his censorship is an 
inappropriate restriction of protected speech. In Part VI, this Note 
concludes by proposing that, in situations like this one, courts, public 
employers, and the State must take special care to maintain and 
defend the rights to which all Americans are entitled. While fear has 
played into the public’s views in recent years, the ultimate 
responsibility of protecting constitutional freedoms will lie with the 
courts. 
 14. In addition to the constitutional issues of free speech and academic freedom, there are 
a number of other issues that factor into the Sami Al-Arian case. These include questions of 
contractual obligations, collective bargaining guarantees for arbitration, and due process 
concerns. See Gonzalez, supra note 3, at para. 2; Judge Declines, supra note 4, at para. 2; Press 
Release, USF Chapter, United Faculty of Florida, Due Process [hereinafter Due Process], at 
http://w3.usf.edu/~uff/AlArian/IssuesProcess.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2003). 
 These issues, however, are beyond the scope of this Note. The purpose of this Note is not 
to suggest a specific outcome in the Al-Arian case, but rather to establish general guidelines for 
the protection of essential constitutional freedoms in the face of public distrust and disdain. In 
today’s newly cautious and fearful America, these issues are of paramount importance anytime 
“disruption” is the cause for censure or dismissal from public employment, particularly within 
the academic realm. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol15/iss1/14
p343 Strauss book pages.doc  4/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  Dangerous Thoughts? 347 
 
 
 
I. CONTENT-BASED REGULATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT FREE 
SPEECH 
That “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech” is a deep-rooted maxim of American constitutional law.15 
Courts are willing to take great steps to protect the safety of this 
American freedom.16 Therefore, any infringement on free speech 
“must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny.”17 
A court’s first step in analyzing the legitimacy of speech 
regulation is to determine whether the restriction is “content-based.”18 
Traditionally, any regulation based on the content of the speech has 
been deemed content-based.19 In recent years, even restrictions based 
on the speech’s effect on listeners have been declared content-
based.20 
Once deemed to be a content-based restriction of free speech, the 
regulation survives only if it is narrowly drawn to further a 
compelling state interest.21 A restriction is narrowly drawn when it 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 16. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (“As a general matter, we have 
indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, 
speech in order to provide ‘adequate ‘breathing space’ to the freedoms protected by the First 
Amendment.”) (citation omitted); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) 
(“[There is] a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, 
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”); Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 17. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321. 
 18. Reasonable restrictions on only the time, place, or manner of speech, with complete 
disregard for the actual content of the speech, may be permissible. See United States v. Grace, 
461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). On the other hand, where a restriction is considered content-based, it 
will be upheld only after passing the court’s strict scrutiny. Boos, 458 U.S. at 321. 
 19. Boos, 458 U.S. at 335–36 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“The traditional approach sets forth a bright-line rule: any restriction on speech, the 
application of which turns on the content of the speech, is a content-based restriction regardless 
of the motivation that lies behind it.”). 
 20. In Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), the Supreme Court held that 
regulations aimed solely at the “secondary effects” of speech or expression on the surrounding 
community are justifiable, content-neutral restrictions. In Boos, however, the majority 
distinguished a listeners’ reaction from “secondary effects,” reasoning that a regulation based 
on the former “targets the direct impact of a particular category of speech, not a secondary 
feature that happens to be associated with that type of speech.” 458 U.S. at 321. See also 
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992).  
 21. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
Another question to consider is how the courts will determine what constitutes a “compelling 
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“employs the least restrictive means” to promote its interest.22 In 
addition, there must be a clear “nexus between the government’s 
compelling interest and the restriction.”23 
The government bears a substantial burden when it regulates 
speech.24 If the government can meet its burden by passing the strict 
scrutiny test, then the regulation may be upheld, despite the 
restriction it places on free speech.25 In practice, however, it may be 
very difficult for the regulation to survive the strict scrutiny 
examination.26 Therefore, content-based infringements on free speech 
are often declared unconstitutional.27 
II. THE “FIGHTING WORDS” DOCTRINE 
The strict scrutiny test is applied whenever there is a content-
based restriction on speech protected by the First Amendment. Some 
state interest.” In its simplist form, a definition might be sought by balancing the general 
interest in protecting free speech with the government’s interest that is purportedly furthered by 
the restriction. See PSINET, Inc. v. Chapman, 167 F. Supp. 2d 878, 886 (W.D. Va. 2001) 
(“[T]he burden imposed by the government on speech must be outweighed by the benefits 
gained by the challenged [restriction].”). 
 22. PSINET, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 886; see also Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. 
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). Thus, where a less restrictive approach might have been 
equally (or more) effective in furthering the State’s legitimate interest, the infringement on free 
speech does not satisfy strict scrutiny and is unconstitutional. PSINET, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 886 
(citation omitted). 
 23. PSINET, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 886 (“It is not enough to show that the Government’s 
ends are compelling; the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.”) (citation 
omitted); Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 
254 (1957). 
 24. Any content-based restriction on speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment 
is presumptively invalid. See Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126. To overcome this 
presumption, the government must not only allege a compelling state interest, but it must also 
show a nexus between the legitimate interest and the proposed restriction upon speech. “This 
burden is not insignificant.” PSINET, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 884. The fact “that the Government’s 
asserted interests are important in the abstract does not mean, however, that the [restriction 
upon speech] will, in fact, advance those interests.” Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 
664 (1994) (quoting Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
Without this nexus, no compelling interest, no matter how great, will persuade the courts to 
permit a functionally unrelated restriction on free speech to stand. Id. 
 25. PSINET, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 884. 
 26. Id. at 884.  
 27. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); Forsyth County v. 
Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992); Sable Communications, 492 U.S. 115; Boos v. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1985); PSINET, 167 F. Supp. 2d 878. 
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classes of speech, however, have traditionally been outside the 
Constitution’s protection.28 Among those classes of speech are 
“fighting words,” defined as speech uttered with little or no 
expressive purpose and tending to cause a swift, violent response or 
an immediate breach of the peace.29 
When the restricted speech constitutes fighting words, the strict 
scrutiny test is unnecessary.30 Free speech is not an absolute freedom 
and fighting words are without First Amendment protection.31 The 
difficulty in applying this doctrine is determining what speech is or is 
not “fighting words.” It is unclear as to where unprotected speech 
ends and protected—even if offensive or inflammatory—speech 
begins.32 
To determine the scope of the “fighting words” doctrine, one must 
first consider the role of free speech and the purpose for denying 
protection to certain narrowly defined classes of speech. One must 
apply a balancing test, weighing the value (if any) of the restricted 
 28. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire is the landmark case in defining unprotected classes of 
speech. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), aff’g State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 
754, 91 N.H. 310 (N.H. 1941). In Chaplinsky, a man was convicted of violating a state statute 
when, in a face-to-face confrontation, he shouted strong and offensive epithets at a city marshal. 
Id. at 569. 
 29. Justice Murphy, delivering the opinion of the Court in Chaplinsky, offered the 
following rationale: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention 
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. 
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 
‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace. 
Id. at 571–72 (footnote omitted). See also Hershfield v. Commonwealth, 417 S.E.2d 876, 879 
(Va. Ct. App. 1992) (“[T]he words must ‘by their very utterance provoke a swift physical 
retaliation and incite an immediate breach of the peace.’”); KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING 
WORDS 50–53 (3d ed. 1996) (suggesting that “fighting words” are those that are uttered with no 
expressive intent or purpose, but solely to inflict harm and to instigate a violent response). 
 30. The purpose of the strict scrutiny test is to protect individuals from governmental 
restrictions on constitutional freedoms. See supra notes 15–27 and accompanying text. When, 
as with fighting words, no constitutional freedom is guaranteed, the strict scrutiny test would 
serve no real purpose. 
 31. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571 (“[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech 
is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”). 
 32. See generally GREENAWALT, supra note 29 (discussing the “fighting words” doctrine 
and its applicability).  
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speech against the benefit gained from the restriction.33 However, 
there is a significant difference between this balancing test and the 
strict scrutiny balancing test. When applying strict scrutiny, the court 
focuses on the weight of the government’s compelling interest.34 On 
the other hand, in defining fighting words and other unprotected 
classes of speech, the court focuses on the speech, and its overall lack 
of weight or compelling purpose.35 
It follows that, perhaps, “fighting words” must also be defined by 
the intent or purpose of the speaker.36 To be censored, the targeted 
speech must do more than offend, it must be intended to provoke a 
physical and violent response from the person to whom the speech 
was directed.37 The anticipated response must be immediate and 
imminent, thus requiring the target of the speaker’s epithets to be 
present and in close proximity.38 
A survey of the relevant case law illustrates a general rule for 
defining legitimately unprotected fighting words. To be outside the 
protection of the First Amendment, utterances must: (1) be directed at 
an individual or group; (2) be in the addressee’s presence and “face-
to-face”; (3) lack the intent to disseminate ideas; and (4) be intended 
 33. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 34. The benefits derived from furthering a “compelling state interest” are balanced against 
the significant burden the proposed restriction or constraint places on free speech. PSINET, Inc. 
v. Chapman, 167 F. Supp. 2d 878, 886 (W.D. Va. 2001). 
 35. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.  
 36. In the case of Mr. Chaplinsky, for example, his utterance “was not useful or proper 
comment for bringing truth to light. [Rather, the utterance’s] plain tendency was to further 
breach of order, and it was itself a breach of the peace.” State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 758 
(N.H. 1941), aff’d, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 37. In Virginia, an abusive language statute is constitutional, and a conviction may be 
upheld when fighting words are uttered, such that “the use of such words under the 
circumstances are reasonably calculated to provoke a violent reaction and retaliation.” Mercer 
v. Winston, 199 S.E.2d 724, 727 (Va. 1973) (upholding a conviction where the defendant 
cursed and shouted “violent abusive language” at a Richmond police officer during a public 
uprising). The Supreme Court roundly rejected a similar Georgia statute for “utterances where 
there was no likelihood that the person addressed would make an immediate violent response 
. . . .” Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972). 
 38. Hershfield v. Commonwealth, 417 S.E.2d 876, 879 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (Benton, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he constitutional application of this statute depends upon whether ‘fighting 
words’ were spoken in [the addressee’s] presence”). The Supreme Court “has never upheld a 
conviction for fighting words that don’t involve face-to-face encounters . . .” Jeffrey Rosen, 
Fighting Words, LEGAL AFF., May-June 2002, at 16, available at WL 2002-JUN LEGAFF 16. 
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to provoke an immediate and violent response from the addressee, so 
as to constitute an instant breach of the peace.39 
III. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND ITS LIMITATIONS  
The Supreme Court often describes the doctrine of academic 
freedom as “a special concern of the First Amendment.”40 As such, 
the judiciary generally cautions the government against restricting 
individuals’ rights in this area.41 Yet, as with most constitutional 
freedoms, academic freedom is not absolute.42 Therefore, lines must 
be drawn to determine when academic freedom is entrusted to the 
professor and when control is vested elsewhere, such as with the 
academic institution or the State. 
A. Statements Within the Classroom 
Teacher-based academic freedom is grounded in the fundamental 
purpose of the classroom: To serve as a “marketplace of ideas.”43 
 39. Hershfield, 417 S.E.2d at 879–80 (Benton, J., concurring) (citations omitted) 
(providing one of the most comprehensive judicial definitions of fighting words). 
 40. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of 
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom 
is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws 
that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. 
Id.; see also Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 41. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (holding that the 
liberties of academic freedom and political expression are “areas in which [the] government 
should be extremely reticent to tread”). 
 42. “By now, most have come to accept it as a fact of life that the members of a different 
profession—the judiciary—will have much to say about what academic freedom does and does 
not cover. ” Walter P. Metzger, Professional and Legal Limits to Academic Freedom, 20 J.C. & 
U.L. 1, 1 (1993). Courts have held that academic freedom is not an expressly guaranteed 
constitutional freedom: “Though we are mindful of the invaluable role academic freedom plays 
in our public schools, particularly at the post-secondary level, we do not find support to 
conclude that academic freedom is an independent First Amendment right.” Bishop, 926 F.2d at 
1075. 
 43. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (“The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ 
The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust 
exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through 
any kind of authoritative selection.’”) (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (alteration in original)). 
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Because the academic university is “characterized by the spirit of free 
inquiry,” members of the institution implicitly bear the right “to 
examine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and beliefs.”44 
Within the classroom, however, even members of the academic 
profession acknowledge that limits exist.45 For example, the 
American Association of University Professors (“AAUP”) prohibits 
professors from acting unprofessionally or dishonestly and from 
engaging in “meaningless scholarship.”46 Outside the classroom, the 
profession recognizes the need for professors to be “duty-bound to 
preserve the dignity of their calling.”47 
The courts, however, have held that, in many respects, academic 
freedom is actually vested in the university, rather than in the 
individual professors.48 In Bishop v. Aronov, the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that a university classroom is not an open 
forum during instructional class time.49 While it is possible for an 
institution to create an open forum in its facilities, it may also restrict 
the use of such facilities whenever it deems it necessary.50 
With regard to in-class activities, courts have repeatedly held “that 
universities and schools should have the freedom to make decisions 
about how and what to teach.”51 Perhaps the most repeated judicial 
explanation of university control over the classroom is found in 
 44. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262.  
 45. Metzger, supra note 42, at 2. 
 46. Eugene H. Bramhall & Ronald Z. Ahrens, Academic Freedom and the Status of the 
Religiously Affiliated University, 37 GONZ. L. REV. 227, 241 (2002) (citing AAUP, GENERAL 
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, 1915, reprinted in 2 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 860 
(Richard Hofstadter & Wilson Smith eds., 1961)). 
 47. Metzger, supra note 42, at 2. 
 48. The Supreme Court has been reluctant “to trench on the prerogatives of state and local 
educational institutions” and has taken on a “responsibility to safeguard [the institutions’] 
academic freedom. . . .” Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985). The 
Court further noted: “Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited 
exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on 
autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself.” Id. at 226 n.12 (citations omitted); see also 
Bramhall & Ahrens, supra note 46, at 244. 
 49. 926 F.2d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 50. While overruling the district court’s opinion that a classroom is necessarily an open 
forum, the Eleventh Circuit opinion quoted Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 
260, 267 (1988), which held a school classroom is not, per se, an open forum for the unbridled 
exchange of ideas. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1071  
 51. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 237 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring), 
quoted in Bramhall & Ahrens, supra note 46, at 244. 
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Sweezy v. New Hampshire, where the Supreme Court emphasized the 
“four essential freedoms” of the institution.52 These freedoms, which 
include the determination of who may teach and what may be taught, 
apply to in-class speech; however, the rules are different for speech 
outside the classroom.53 
B. Out-of-Classroom Statements and Restrictions 
Even when an employee addresses his statements to the general 
public, outside of the classroom, the State, as an employer, maintains 
certain interests and authority over its academic employees.54 
However, this control is far less pervasive than control over in-class 
speech. In these cases, courts have framed the issue much like 
content-based free speech cases, relying less on principles of 
academic freedom and more on balancing individual and state 
interests to reach a conclusion.55 
IV. THE DISRUPTION DOCTRINE 
Disciplinary action for public teachers’ and professors’ statements 
made outside the scope of employment are hardly “academic 
freedom” cases. Rather, these scenarios are reviewed like those of 
 52. The Supreme Court enumerated the “four essential freedoms” to explain the legal 
basis and meaning of “academic freedom,” as it applies to universities. Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting a statement of a 
conference of senior scholars from the University of Cape Town and the University of 
Witwatersrand in South Africa stating “the four essential freedoms” of a university are to 
determine “who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be 
admitted to study.”).  
 53.  In regulating in-class utterances, courts look to “the ‘basic education mission’ of the 
school which gives it authority by the use of ‘reasonable restrictions’ over in-class speech that it 
could not censor outside the classroom.” Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074 (quoting Kuhlmeier, 484 
U.S. at 266–67). 
 54. “While neither teachers nor students ‘shed their constitutional rights to [free speech] at 
the schoolhouse gate[,]’ the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its 
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the 
speech of the citizenry in general.” Id. at 1072 (citations omitted) (brackets in original). 
 55. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) The goal of out-of-
school speech cases “is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Id. 
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other public employees who are terminated for sharing their views.56 
The employee’s protections and rights depend upon the nature of the 
utterance or action and the disruption of the public employer’s ability 
to efficiently provide public services.57 
A. The State’s Rights as an Employer 
In cases like Al-Arian’s, where an individual brings a 
constitutional claim against his public employer, the State is forced to 
play a peculiar role. The State, as sovereign, ordinarily cannot 
encroach on an individual’s speech rights.58 However, when the State 
acts as an employer, courts have granted the State greater latitude to 
limit employees’ expression.59 
When acting as an employer, the State serves a dual function: it 
must abide by the Constitution and it must effectively provide public 
services to the citizenry.60 The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
recognized a “common sense realization” that public employers 
cannot operate “if every employment decision became a 
constitutional matter.”61 Curiously, however, courts have also held 
that a State may not discharge an employee with total disregard for 
 56. Compare Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 (examining a public schoolteacher’s right to 
publicly criticize his district’s financial policies), with Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) 
(considering an incendiary questionnaire distributed by an assistant district attorney to co-
workers), and Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (addressing comments made by a 
clerk in a county constable’s office regarding an assassination attempt on the President of the 
United States). Each of these cases applied the same basic test, balancing the right of the 
employee to speak on matters of public concern with the state’s right as employer, to ensure the 
efficiency of the public services it offers. 
 57. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568–73. 
 58. See supra notes 15–27 and accompanying text. This rule holds true except in those 
cases in which either the restriction complies with a strict scrutiny judicial standard, supra notes 
15–27, or the actions or utterances fall within a class of speech outside the First Amendment’s 
protection, supra notes 28–39 and accompanying text. 
 59. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (“[W]e have always assumed 
. . . that the government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government 
as sovereign.”).  
 60. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 378, 384. 
 61. Connick, 461 U.S. at 143 (footnote omitted). As an illustration, consider a D.M.V. 
employee who is repeatedly rude to customers. The State, as employer, must have the ability to 
remedy the situation, even though such a “non-rudeness” standard set by the State, as sovereign, 
would be “almost certainly too vague when applied to the public at large.” Waters, 511 U.S. at 
673 (citations omitted). 
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her constitutionally protected speech rights.62 This dichotomy gives 
the judiciary the task of resolving the balance between two 
substantially competing interests. 
B. The Pickering Balancing Test 
When a public employee comments on matters of public concern, 
his free speech rights are generally protected and must be balanced 
against the State’s interest in effectively providing public services 
without substantial disruption.63 In Pickering v. Board of Education, 
the Supreme Court addressed a teacher’s out-of-school statement 
criticizing his public employer.64 In holding for the teacher, the Court 
employed a two-part test to determine the validity of this type of 
employee speech restriction.65 
The first prong of the test requires a showing that the restricted 
statements addressed a “matter of public concern.”66 The burden then 
shifts to the State to show that its interest, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of its public services outweighs the 
employee’s free speech rights.67 The Court, in Pickering, suggested 
several factors that may create a substantial State interest, many of 
 62. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 383 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). In 
Perry, a teacher was ordered reinstated after being terminated for publicly voicing opinions on 
his college’s potential elevation to four-year status. The Supreme Court held that the 
employee’s freedom of speech was violated if his termination was based on his criticism of 
administration policies. 408 U.S. at 598. 
 63. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 64. Id. at 564–67. Marvin Pickering, a schoolteacher, published a letter in a local 
newspaper criticizing his school district employer for mishandling revenue-producing 
proposals. Id. at 564. After a full hearing, the Board of Education determined that his letter was 
detrimental to the efficient operation of the schools. Id. at 566–67. The Board dismissed 
Pickering, stating that such action was necessitated by the “interests of the schools.” Id. at 565. 
 65. See generally id. at 568–73.  
 66. Id. at 568–70; see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987) (quoting 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). While this first prong was barely addressed in 
the Pickering opinion, it has been the central issue in a number of other cases. See, e.g., Rankin, 
483 U.S. at 384–87; Connick, 461 U.S. at 143–49. Though only sporadically addressed in 
Pickering, the Court indicated that the teacher-employee’s published statements clearly 
addressed matters of public concern, making detailed analysis unnecessary. Pickering, 391 U.S. 
at 570–72. 
 67. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
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which addressed workplace disruption.68 Thus, the State must 
produce adequate evidence of a resulting disruption.69 
Although the Pickering balancing test is, theoretically, easy to 
apply, there has been a great deal of debate over its definitions. 
Parties, and Justices of the Supreme Court, often disagree about what 
constitutes “public concern” and what situations create an “adequate 
disruption.”70  
1. Defining “Matters of Public Concern” 
For at least a half-century, public employers were treated like 
private employers with respect to personnel decisions. The employer 
was generally permitted to place any conditions it deemed necessary 
on employment, even if these conditions invaded constitutional 
freedoms.71 However, beginning in the 1950s, and continuing through 
the Pickering decision in 1968, the Court struck down restrictions 
that “sought to suppress the rights of public employees to participate 
in public affairs.”72 
 68. Id. at 569–73. All but one of the Court’s factors in Pickering dealt with various forms 
of disruption. Id. This notion of disruption is central to the University of South Florida’s 
argument against Sami Al-Arian, which claims that his statements or actions directly interfered 
with the school’s ability to offer its public services. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying 
text. 
 The one factor dealing less directly with disruption involves an employee’s remarks that 
“are so without foundation as to call into question his fitness to perform his duties.” Pickering, 
391 U.S. at 573 n.5. When such a situation arises in public universities, even the AAUP 
recognizes this restriction, requiring that the instructor possess honesty and a sense of duty to 
the profession. Bramhall & Ahrens, supra note 46, at 241; Metzger, supra note 42, at 2. 
 69. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388. 
 70. For example, in Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, compare the majority opinion, 
id. at 379–92, with the dissenting opinion, id. at 394–401. Justice White and Justice Scalia 
completely disagree as to whether comments made by a public employee regarding the 
assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan constituted remarks regarding a matter of 
public concern. Justice White, writing for the majority, reasoned that speech regarding the life 
and death of the President “plainly dealt with a matter of public concern.” Id. at 386–87. Justice 
Scalia, however, disagreed with this analysis, arguing that the statements, when taken in 
context, could not “be fairly viewed as lying within the ‘heart’ of the First Amendment’s 
protection.” Id. at 396–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 71. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 143–44. Justice Holmes coined a commonly quoted maxim: 
“[A policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right 
to be a policeman.” McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
 72. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963); Cramp v. Bd. of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Cafeteria Workers v. 
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Despite the recent crackdown on oppressive speech restrictions, 
the Court does not allow the First Amendment to fully shield public 
employees from reprimand for all of their speech.73 In fact, speech 
regarding purely private or personal matters is not free from 
restriction in the public workplace.74 Though the Court is quick to 
note that speech on private matters is not wholly without protection, 
it has reasoned that a “federal court is not the appropriate forum” in 
which to review such cases.75 
The Court has taken different approaches to determine whether an 
employee’s speech or actions related to a matter of public concern. 
Sometimes, the Court focuses on the intent of the actor.76 Other 
times, the Court looks directly to the statement’s content.77 
Fortunately, the Court has expressly renounced the position that the 
actor’s specific viewpoint affects the degree of his First Amendment 
protection.78 Despite these various factors and approaches, however, 
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 278 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 U.S. 479 (1960); Connick, 461 U.S. at 144–45 (citing Wiemann v. Updegraff, 244 U.S. 183 
(1952)). 
 73. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149 (“[T]he First Amendment does not require a public office to 
be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs.”). 
 74.  See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994). 
[W]e have refrained from intervening in government employer decisions that are based 
on speech that is of entirely private concern. Doubtless some such speech is sometimes 
nondisruptive; doubtless it is sometimes of value to the speakers and the listeners. But 
we have declined to question government employers’ decisions on such matters. 
Id. This laissez-faire attitude of the Court rests upon the policy that, when possible, 
“government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive 
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. 
 75. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147; see also Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384 n.7. 
 76. In Connick v. Myers, the Court denied respondent’s claim that her actions were related 
to a matter of public concern, holding that her statements were more aptly characterized as an 
extension of a dispute with her superiors. 461 U.S. at 148.  
 77. In Rankin v. McPherson, where the respondent commented on the Reagan 
assassination attempt, the majority held that her statements dealt with a matter of public 
concern. 483 U.S. at 386. Justice Marshall reasoned that she was having a conversation 
addressing the government’s current policies and was commenting on a “matter of heightened 
public attention.” Id. 
 78.  “The inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the 
question whether it deals with a matter of public concern.” Id. at 387. Statements criticizing 
public policy must be protected “to give freedom of expression the breathing space it needs to 
survive.” Id. (quoting Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136 (1966)). This would not hold true if the 
Rankin respondent’s statement had amounted to a credible threat to kill the President, as such 
expression is always outside the protection of the First Amendment. 483 U.S. at 386–87. 
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the Court’s conclusions often indicate a reliance on common sense 
and intuition.79 
2. Disruption to the Efficient Function of the Public Employer 
Once the actor shows that his contested speech related to a matter 
of public concern, the State bears the burden of justifying the 
termination on valid grounds.80 Generally, the State can meet this 
burden by showing a disruption to the employer’s ability to provide 
public services efficiently through its employees.81 Courts have found 
that a disruption may arise from either a resulting impediment to the 
employee’s “proper performance of his daily duties,” or an 
“interfer[ence] with the regular operation” of the public employer’s 
business.82 
The Supreme Court has recognized many types of disruption.83 
Statements or actions may undermine the employee’s superiors’ or 
management’s authority.84 This lack of authority will often lead to 
increased difficulty in maintaining discipline in the workplace.85 
 79. Consider the Rankin Court’s statement, quoting the Court of Appeals’ decision: 
“[T]he life and death of the President are obviously matters of public concern.” Id. at 385 
(citation omitted). Sometimes, as in this case and the Pickering case, reliance on common sense 
and intuition take the place of a detailed analysis into the issue of public concern. 
 80. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388. 
 81. See, e.g., Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388. It is also interesting to note that the strength of the 
showing of disruption required in any given case is directly tied to the statement’s degree of 
involvement in matters of public concern. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152. 
 82. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572–73 (1968) (finding that the teacher-
employee’s public statements were permissible and free from restriction because they led to 
neither of these detrimental results).  
 83. “We have previously recognized as pertinent considerations whether the statement 
impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on 
close working relationship for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes 
the performance of the speaker’s duties.” Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 
570–73). 
 84. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 680–81 (1994). In Pickering, where the 
Board of Education claimed damage to its professional reputation, it feared an undermining of 
authority in the form of “controversy and conflict among the Board, teachers, administrators, 
and the residents of the district.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570. The Court noted a lack of evidence 
to support an allegation of damage to reputation, but seemed to suggest that, if substantiated, 
such a finding would be significant in a review of the employer’s actions. Id. 
 85. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 151 (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974)); 
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569–70 (suggesting statements impeding the maintenance of discipline 
might be actionable by the public employer). 
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Further, the Court has stressed the importance of considering whether 
the terminated employee’s behavior jeopardized the harmonious 
functioning of important close working relationships between co-
workers.86 In sum, the Court generally bases its analysis on the 
contested statement’s direct interference with relationships between 
various members of the workplace community.87  
C. Reliance upon Third-Party Reports of Employee’s Statements or 
Conduct 
While much of the relevant case law addresses situations in which 
the employer heard the employee’s statements,88 situations exist in 
which the employer must rely on third-party reports of the 
employee’s conduct.89 The Court has generally acknowledged that, 
although reliance of this sort is tantamount to decision-making based 
on hearsay, the evidentiary rules of ordinary judicial procedure are 
not reasonably applicable to everyday life or personnel decisions.90 
Yet, permitting reliance on third-party reports poses the significant 
threat of restricting properly protected speech.91 
In a concurring opinion in Waters v. Churchill, Justice Souter 
explained that such a risk is tolerable, but only under certain 
 86. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151–52. 
 87. Id.; see also Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388 (listing various recognized forms of disruption 
previously considered by the Supreme Court). 
 88. See, e.g., Rankin, 483 U.S. 378 (concerning an employee’s remarks, which she later 
admitted to her supervisor); Connick, 461 U.S. 138 (concerning a employee-written 
questionnaire distributed to co-workers); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) 
(concerning a public disagreement about policy between a professor and his public college 
employer); Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 (concerning a letter to the editor, written by the employee, 
published in a local newspaper). 
 89. A prime example is Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994). Waters, a nurse, had a 
discussion with a second nurse, describing serious problems in her department. Id. at 665. This 
dissuaded the second nurse from transferring into the department. Id. A third nurse overheard 
the conversation and reported it to the supervisor, who investigated the situation and eventually 
terminated Waters’s employment. Id. at 664–66. 
 These “third-party report” situations are presumably common, and the issue certainly arises 
when analyzing the dispute between USF and Sami Al-Arian. Many of Al-Arian’s “statements” 
were actually allegations of his beliefs and actions, attributed to him by Bill O’Reilly. See supra 
notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 90. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 675–77. “What works best in a judicial proceeding may not 
be appropriate in the employment context.” Id. at 676. 
 91. Id. at 683–84 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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conditions.92 First, the public employer must undertake a “reasonable 
investigation” into the situation to establish the actual facts.93 After 
the investigation, the employer should, in good faith, conclude that 
the report is a true and accurate reflection of the employee’s 
disruptive speech or actions.94 Justice Souter believed that if either of 
these elements was missing, then the employee’s free speech rights 
were violated.95 These additional precautions are necessary to 
safeguard the First Amendment’s primary goal of “full protection of 
speech upon issues of public concern.”96 
V. ANALYSIS 
Those who have denounced USF’s termination of Sami Al-Arian 
as a great injustice—including other USF faculty, the Foundation for 
Individual Rights in Education (“FIRE”), certain members of the 
media, and Al-Arian himself—have typically framed the situation in 
terms of academic freedom.97 Although this may be proper in the 
“professional” sense, it may not be an appropriate analysis under 
constitutional law.98 In a legal sense, the four “essential” academic 
 92. Id. at 684. After satisfying these criteria, however, an employer may validly terminate 
an employee, even where the substantive information that forms the basis of such termination 
turns out to be incorrect. Id. at 679. 
 93. Id. at 677, 679.  
 94. Id. at 684 (Souter, J., concurring). This second element of analysis, requiring the 
employer to actually believe the report concerning the employee’s alleged misconduct, is found 
only in Justice Souter’s concurring opinion. Id. at 682–83. The plurality opinion—and thus, the 
current law—merely requires a reasonable investigation into the allegations of the third-party 
report. 
 95. Id. at 684–85 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 96. Id. at 684. 
 97. See Eric Boehlert, The Prime-Time Smearing of Sami Al-Arian, SALON.COM (Jan. 19, 
2002), at http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/01/19/bubba/index.html (on file with the 
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy); Halvorssen, supra note 2; Fire Scholar, 
supra note 2, at A18; Press Release, USF Chapter, United Faculty of Florida (“UFF”), Why 
Freedom for Academics? [hereinafter Freedom for Academics], at http://w3.usf.edu/~uff/ 
AlArian/IssuesAcadFree.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2003) (on file with the Washington 
University Journal of Law & Policy). 
 98. “[C]onstitutional and professional definitions of academic freedom are separate and 
distinct.” Rob Brannon, AAUP Says USF Court Case Will Have No Effect, THE ORACLE (Nov. 
18, 2002) (quoting an AAUP statement at its semiannual meeting on November 2, 2002), 
available at http://www.usfovacle.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2002/11/18/3dd8ec962984f (on 
file with the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy). 
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freedoms are vested in the university,99 and individual professors 
enjoy little or no protection regarding what they teach. Further, 
“academic freedom” generally applies only to those statements made 
within the university community and within the professor’s scope of 
employment.100 USF acknowledged that Al-Arian’s actions and 
statements were “unrelated to [his] University duties.”101 As a result, 
the legal doctrine of academic freedom is not relevant to the Al-Arian 
case. 
If Al-Arian’s statements could be classified as “fighting words,” 
other analysis would be moot. Fighting words fall into a class of 
“unprotected” speech, having no First Amendment freedoms 
protection.102 Fighting words, however, are very narrowly defined, 
requiring (1) face-to-face confrontation,103 and (2) provocation of 
swift physical retaliation and immediate breach of the peace.104 Thus, 
only “personally abusive epithets” are generally considered “fighting 
words.”105 Under this approach, Al-Arian’s comments do not qualify 
as fighting words. The immediate cause of the public’s outburst, the 
O’Reilly Factor broadcast, did not include anything akin to fighting 
words.106 Neither do the circumstances surrounding his comments in 
 99. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(quoting Statement, Conference of Senior Scholars, University of Cape Town and University of 
Witwatersand 10–12); see also supra note 52 and accompanying text. Recall that the Supreme 
Court has declared that, as a general rule, “academic freedom” is vested in the institution, 
granting the institution the right to determine what is taught, in what manner, and by whom. See 
supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
 100. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
 101. Gonzalez, supra note 3. 
 102. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.  
 103. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  
 104. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.  
 105. Hershfield v. Commonwealth, 417 S.E.2d 876, 879–80 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (Benton, 
J., concurring). 
 106. It was Al-Arian’s purported intent to appear on the show in order to discuss the 
peaceful side of Islam with the frightened American public in the aftermath of the September 
11th terrorist attacks. James O. Castagnera et al., Tenure Under Attack in 2002, 18 No. 4 
TERMINATION EMP. BULL. 3 (Apr. 2002). 
 If anyone uttered fighting words during that interview, it was Bill O’Reilly himself, who 
tried to provoke Al-Arian with accusations of ties to terrorism. Al-Arian spent most of the 
interview trying to defend himself against the accusations. For a partial transcript of the 
interview, see FOX News Channel, Transcript: O’Reilly Interviews Al-Arian in September 
2001 (Aug. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Transcript], at http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
0,2933,61096,00.html (on file with Washington University Journal of Law & Policy).  
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Cleveland in 1988 satisfy the criteria, as those statements merely 
espoused Al-Arian’s views on the Palestinian conflict, which, while 
unpopular and controversial, are nevertheless protected under the 
First Amendment.107 
Unable to rely on academic freedom or the fighting words 
doctrine, USF is left with a public employer First Amendment free 
speech case and, thus, the Pickering balancing test applies.108 USF 
has implicitly conceded that Al-Arian’s speech addressed matters of 
public concern.109 Thus, it must bring a claim that the speech has 
unacceptably disrupted the public services and education it provides, 
begetting a compelling state interest for Al-Arian’s termination. 
USF relied on a third-party report of Al-Arian’s statements: Bill 
O’Reilly’s allegations of terrorist connections.110 USF purported to 
investigate the events that led to the alleged disruption,111 but when 
relying on third-party reports, the investigation and conclusion drawn 
must be objectively reasonable in light of the record.112 Such 
reasonableness is questionable here, because USF’s conclusions were 
not drawn from official or reliable sources. 
 107. These statements delivered at a convention, were made in Arabic to a crowd of 
Palestinian supporters. See Transcript, supra note 106; Castagnera et al., supra note 106. The 
statements, controversial though they may be, were certainly not intended to provoke swift 
physical retaliation against the speaker. Rather, Al Arian’s presumed intent was to share his 
political views with others who agreed with him. The fighting words doctrine is not intended to 
target this type of utterance. See supra note 36–38 and accompanying text (discussing the need 
for specific intent in defining “fighting words”). 
 108. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568–73 (1968).  
 109. See Gonzalez, supra note 3. Gonzalez, an attorney retained by USF, noted that R.B. 
Friedlander, USF’s Interim General Counsel, directed him to “place overriding emphasis on Dr. 
Al-Arian’s unquestionable right to engage in protected free speech on matters of public 
concern.” Id. 
 110. Gonzalez admits that the alleged disruption was a result of the “public reaction to 
what Dr. Al-Arian said during his appearance.” Gonzalez, supra note 3, at paras. 5–6. More 
precisely, as Al-Arian did little but defend himself during the interview, the public reacted more 
to what Bill O’Reilly said about Al-Arian during his appearance than anything else. See 
generally Transcript, supra note 106. 
 111. See Gonzales, supra note 3, at para. 6 (citing USF’s September 27, 2001 
announcement of Al-Arian’s placement on paid leave of absence, pending investigation). 
 112. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 677–79 (1994); see also supra notes 93–95 and 
accompanying text. Although the requirement of “actual belief” is a mere suggestion from 
Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Waters v. Churchill, the plurality opinion specifically 
mandates that the employer reach its conclusion reasonably and in good faith. 511 U.S. at 677. 
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Even a casual investigation into the Al-Arian situation raises 
suspicion. Despite O’Reilly’s repeated allegations and accusations, 
no terrorist-related charges had been brought against Al-Arian at the 
time of his termination.113 O’Reilly is further impeached by the other 
misinformation he produced during the interview.114 Even Al-Arian’s 
strong comments made at the 1988 Cleveland convention have been 
explained repeatedly, and perhaps reasonably, by Al-Arian as 
symbolic and political rhetoric.115 Simply put, the truth of the 
allegations to which the public responded is at the least uncertain, if 
not altogether unlikely. 
However, if one assumes that the investigation and conclusion 
were objectively reasonable and reached in good faith, we must 
address the alleged cause of the disruption to USF’s public services. 
USF cites concern for the security of Al-Arian and the campus, 
decreases in charitable giving from donors and alumni, and difficulty 
in recruiting new faculty as the primary sources of disruption.116 
Judging from the factual evidence, USF overestimated the continuing 
alarm over security. An attorney for USF claimed that the USF Police 
Department was unable to guarantee the safety of Al-Arian or 
others.117 Admittedly, twelve death threats against Al-Arian were 
telephoned to USF in the days following the O’Reilly Factor 
appearance.118 Yet, no death threats were received after early October 
 113. See Halvorssen, supra note 2. While Al-Arian was arrested on February 20, 2003, at 
the time of his termination, investigations had not revealed any ties to terrorist activities. See 
supra note 13; see also Addendum, supra note 13. 
 114. For example, he adamantly insisted that Tariq Hamdi—an acquaintance of Al-Arian’s 
and former graduate student at USF—was on the FBI’s “list of suspected terrorists.” See 
Transcript, supra note 106. However, this allegation was “simply not true.” Boehlert, supra 
note 97, at para. 54. In fact, Fox producers admitted to at least one reporter that they “felt like 
O’Reilly got blindsided.” Id. at para. 51 (quoting John Sugg, senior editor of an Atlanta 
newspaper).  
 115. See Transcript, supra note 106 (comparing his comments about “jihad” and 
“revolution” with those made by President George W. Bush about a “crusade” against terrorism 
in the days following the September 11th attacks). In determining a speaker’s intent, it is 
necessary to consider the audience and the surrounding circumstances. See Gooding v. Wilson, 
405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972) (rejecting the application of the “fighting words” doctrine to 
“utterances where there was no likelihood that the person addressed would make an immediate 
violent response.”). 
 116. See Gonzalez, supra note 3, at para. 11.  
 117. Id. (citing a report from the USF Police Department). 
 118. Id. Gonzalez maintained that a number of other angry individuals made phone calls 
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2001.119 The cessation of credible threats, particularly given that USF 
waited until mid-December to terminate Al-Arian,120 lends serious 
doubt to the school’s claim of precarious campus safety. 
USF’s assertion of hampered fundraising as a cause for Al-Arian’s 
termination is derisory and unfounded for three reasons. First, despite 
all the case law delineating relevant factors for disruption, no case 
has suggested that a decrease in funding is pertinent.121 Second, there 
has been a nationwide trend in decreased donative giving since 
September 11, 2001 and the start of the recessed economy.122 Finally, 
the factual evidence suggests that USF may be under as much 
pressure to retain Al-Arian as it is to fire him.123 
USF also cited “difficulties in recruiting” new faculty, particularly 
in Al-Arian’s College of Engineering.124 It seems more likely that 
new faculty refrain from joining USF because of the constraint on Al-
Arian’s rights than because of his particular views.125 The greatest 
harm to faculty recruiting will occur when USF gains a reputation for 
that did not threaten harm, but were merely “abusive in tone and content.” Id. 
 119. USF Police Sergeant Klingebiel supposedly reported this information at the December 
19, 2001 USF Board of Trustees meeting that immediately preceded President Genshaft’s 
statement regarding the decision to terminate Al-Arian’s employment. See Press Release, USF 
Chapter, UFF, The Truth About Sami Al-Arian’s Firing [hereinafter The Truth], at 
http://w3.usf.edu/~uff/AlArian/January/XmasFact.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2003). Any 
genuine “threat,” therefore, existed for no more than a few a weeks—if at all. 
 120. See Genshaft, supra note 4. 
 121. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 
378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 
(1968). The Court, instead, has focused most of its disruption analysis on damage to vital 
interpersonal relationships within the workplace. See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying 
text. 
 122. See The Truth, supra note 119, at para. 2.  
 123. At least one dean has acknowledged the presence of “a lot of pressure on the president 
from both groups—those who favor and those who do not favor the firing.” Castagnera, supra 
note 106 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting “the dean of one of the colleges at South 
Florida”). Although some alumni have cited the “Al-Arian situation” as the reason for 
withdrawing financial support, this does not necessarily imply that these individuals all are 
siding with USF in the controversy. Gonzalez, supra note 3, at para. 13. 
 124. Gonzalez, supra note 3, at para. 13. 
 125. Despite finding a colleague’s views disagreeable or even “abhorrent,” faculty 
members typically defend the colleague’s rights in order to promote “a free and open 
discussion.” The Truth, supra note 119. At least one senior administrator resigned in protest of 
Al-Arian’s termination and the USF Faculty Union voted to condemn the school’s decision. 
Halvorssen, supra note 2, at para. 4. 
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restricting its professors’ rights.126 The AAUP, a powerful and 
influential organization in the academic world, has stated that it 
would vote on a censure of USF if it fires Al-Arian in violation of the 
AAUP’s guidelines for academic freedom.127 The censured label, 
which is semi-permanent,128 may dissuade other reputable professors 
from bringing their knowledge and research to USF.129 This, of 
course, will only exacerbate the “disruptions” of which USF 
complains.130 
VI. PROPOSAL 
The University of South Florida’s actions will create a very 
dangerous precedent of censorship. USF admitted that Al-Arian’s 
termination was in response to the public reaction to his O’Reilly 
Factor appearance.131 This is dangerous, to say the least.132 Members 
of FIRE insist that USF is creating a precedent for a “thug’s veto” of 
unpopular viewpoints.133 USF, the State, and the courts that upheld 
 126. Susan Greenbaum, USF Professor of Anthropology, Letter to the Editor, Faculty May 
Jump Ship Due to BOT, THE ORACLE, Jan. 9, 2003 (on file with the Washington University 
Journal of Law & Policy).  
 127. Brannon, supra note 98, at para. 14. The AAUP will hold its national meeting in early 
June 2003, at which time there will be a vote of whether or not to censure USF. Id. 
 128.  USF would have to wait at least one year to have the label removed, and then only if 
it proves that the termination was proper or offers an apology and reinstates Al-Arian. Id. at 
para. 15. 
 129. The AAUP censure “may make it difficult to garner research and donation dollars . . . 
to attract the best students . . . [and to hire] the best teachers and professors, who may not want 
to be associated with a censured university.” Opinion, Take Censure Most Seriously, THE 
ORACLE, Nov. 19, 2002, at para. 6 [hereinafter Censure] (on file with the Washington 
University Journal of Law & Policy). 
 130. See Greenbaum, supra note 126, at para. 6. The censure will harm the university’s 
reputation during a time when it had seeing excellent growth. Censure, supra note 129, at para. 
5. 
 131. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 132. By firing Al-Arian in response to public demand, USF is “encouraging extremists” 
and is making a statement that “faculty can be punished for the misdeeds of others.” The Truth, 
supra note 119.  
 133. FIRE President Alan Charles Kors wrote: 
[Firing Al-Arian] would allow a “heckler’s veto” and would open the floodgates to 
arbitrary firing of all professors when some individuals, especially individuals willing 
to portray themselves as criminals, decide that they do not like the way that a professor 
talks, thinks, or appears. Indeed, it would create . . . the “USF thug’s veto,” which 
actively encourages the threat of violence to accomplish the dismissal of professors 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p343 Strauss book pages.doc  4/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
366 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 15:343 
 
 
 
the termination, are sending a message of acquiescence.134 Regardless 
of the constitutionality of a thug’s veto, which is highly questionable, 
it would result in the significant chilling of protected speech and 
would undermine the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment. 
USF contended that Sami Al-Arian provoked this situation by 
appearing on the O’Reilly Factor.135 In fact, the situation is simply 
one in which USF fell victim to the impatience and intolerance for 
diversity that arose out of the ashes of the September 11th attacks on 
the United States. Admittedly, Al-Arian’s views are controversial, 
yet, under the First Amendment, opinions need not be popular to be 
protected.136 
Our legal system is premised on a presumption of innocence, a 
presumption which is bypassed when an employer caters to the 
whims of the “vocal protests of those who have already judged” its 
employee.137 If our Nation is to rebound from this dark moment, I 
propose that USF and other public employers, as well as the State of 
Florida itself, remember these principles and stand up to fight for the 
rights and freedoms of their public employees. 
Universities, which claim to serve as a “marketplace of ideas,”138 
must establish or reaffirm policies of nondiscrimination. These 
policies should contain express provisions to deal with circumstances 
in which a professor’s viewpoints spark criticism from the 
surrounding community. Education advances tolerance and 
understanding through contrasting viewpoints and the free discussion 
of ideas. Any university with a policy of repressing unpopular speech 
or controversial ideas, solely because of inconvenience, is not a 
university at all. 
disliked by any portion of the public. 
Halvorssen, supra note 2, at para. 6. 
 134. By permitting the termination, governmental authorities are passively telling the 
public that it can quash disagreeable views by acting outrageously and making reckless (and 
sometimes illegal) threats. 
 135. See Marano, supra note 3, at para. 10. 
 136. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987); W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).  
 137. Halvorssen, supra note 2, at para. 8. 
 138. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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The courts also play a significant role. It may be easier for an 
institution to wash its hands of the situation, rather than defend its 
employee’s rights or rethink and redraft its employment policies. In 
cases where the system fails, as has been the case with Sami Al-Arian 
and USF, the courts must unequivocally strike down the employer’s 
attempt to abandon its employee.139 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Permitting Al-Arian’s termination from the University of South 
Florida tacitly recognizes a new compelling state interest for content-
based speech restriction: prejudice. Such a state-sponsored policy is 
contrary to the Constitution and to the American ideal of freedom. 
While Americans’ nerves were understandably rattled in the 
aftermath of September 11th, our inclination to hastily point fingers 
must be held in check. Our system of justice is based on equality and 
fairness, where all people deserve equal protection under the law. In 
order to remain strong, we must not let this change. 
 139. This Note does not propose that employees should be reinstated when there has been 
clear wrongdoing. If Al-Arian had, in fact, been legitimately implicated in any terrorist acts at 
the time of his termination, USF should not be obligated to defend such actions. However, as 
indicated supra notes 110–30 and accompanying text, Al-Arian’s alleged ties to terrorism were, 
at times, tenuous, at best. The true reason for termination seems simply to be inconvenience, 
which is unacceptable. But see Addendum, supra note 13. 
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